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Abstract 
This essay reconsiders the meaning of politics. It argues that economics offers theory and 
language that can contribute to the understanding and fulfillment of political life by facilitating 
analysis of the public interest. However, economics does not provide an escape from political 
disagreement, whether based on inevitable differences of interest or of belief, or on self-serving 
efforts to advance one cause at the expense of another. As a language of discourse, economics is 
shown to be compatible with a broader conception of human nature than is sometimes claimed by 
its practicioners or acknowledged by its critics. 
*I would like to acknowledge the helpful observations and suggestions of Henry Chappell, Robert
Gallman, Robert Grafstein, Ruth Grant, Stephen Leonard, William Mitchell, Christopher Nelson, 
Paul Quirk, Glendon Schubert, Kenneth Shepsle, and Juerg Steiner. The National Science 
Foundation has supported my efforts to learn economics and to use it in political analysis. 
I 
If asked to define the subject of our discipline, many of us would respond almost 
instinctively with David Easton's venerable capsule that politics is "the authoritative allocation of 
values" ( 1953, pp. 129- 134). Others might think of Harold Lasswell's "Politics: Who Gets What, 
When, How". I would like to suggest that both of these rather similar conceptions are too narrow, 
not very informative, and perhaps even misleading. 
Easton's definition is "taxonomic". That is, it identifies politics in terms of "a restricted set 
of properties shared by all events describable as political". In fact, politics has been recognized for 
some time as a cluster concept, "extending to a heterogeneous range of events loosely linked in a 
'family resemblance' way" (Frohock 1978, p. 859).1 Clearly the term "politics" as we appropriately
use it is too protean to lend itself to taxonomic definition. As such, it is like freedom, justice, 
equality, and the public interest, in that it is used in ordinary discourse in many different ways. 
No single definition will be satisfactory. 
In ordinary discourse, the term politics often has a negative connotation. When someone 
says "well, that's politics", or "it was a political decision'', this is rarely an expression of approval. 
However, our discipline is built on a tradition extending from Aristotle through Mill to Barber, 
Mansbridge, and Pateman that sees political life as one of the loftiest expressions of the human 
spirit. 
Even when both the positive and the negative connotations are recognized at once, politics 
is often seen as subjective and indeterminate. Consider the following: 
politics is an imponderable, a constantly and unpredictably shifting mixture of forces of 
the most diverse nature, comprehending acts of great moral virtue {the emancipation of 
slaves) and of the most vulgar venality (the congressman feathering his own nest). 
This quote is from a famous article by George Stigler ( 197 1 ), a Nobel Prize winning 
economist. It is a view that he meant to discredit and improve upon, because it characterizes the 
political process as defying rational explanation. The contrasting view he presents is as follows: 
We assume that political systems are rationally devised and rationally employed, which is 
to say that they are appropriate instruments for the fulfillment of desires of members of 
the society ( 1988, p. 210). 
Stigler proposes the development of a "rational theory of political behavior" that would develop 
the "basic logic of political life" with the application of economic reasoning, and enable us to make 
more sensible reforms. 
Since 1971, when his article was written, there has been a steady stream of activity by 
political scientists and economists that is very much in the spirit of his exhortation. There has 
been considerable progress towards a rational theory of political behavior.2 My understanding of 
politics has been a major beneficiary of this work. However, I will suggest here that both of 
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Stigler's characterizations of politics may be partially correct, including the one he discredited as 
well as the one he endorsed. 
Poli tics in Economics I: 
Conceptualizing the Public Interest. 
There are two kinds of negative images of politics noted above: vulgar and venal on the 
one hand, and defying rational explanation on the other. The latter is one step away from 
irrational. Insofar as political life is vulgar, venal, and irrational, it is hardly surprising that it has 
a bad name. The effort to apply economic reasoning to politics has much contrasting appeal, if 
only to get the politics out of political life, at least in the negative sense of the term. 
The appeals of economic reasoning for political science include rigor, precision, and the 
absence of the vagueness that often characterizes political concepts, many of which are cluster 
concepts like politics itself. Moreover, economics offers theory about the aggregation of individual 
choices into collective decisions, and about the consequences of individual and collective choices. 
Still more important for my purposes is the fact that economics offers theory that relates these 
consequences to conceptions of collective well-being. 
This last point is politically relevant, not because it involves an "authoritative allocation of 
values", but because collective well-being is similar to the public interest, the common good, or 
the general welfare. These concepts have been elements of political discussion for ages. In the high 
tide of positivism in political science, they were denigrated as meaningless. Glendon Schubert, for 
example, argued that there is no public interest theory worthy of the name, and that the concept 
itself makes no operational sense ( 1962, pp. 175- 176). This assessment implied that the concept of 
the public interest was not worthy of further scientific or scholarly discussion. 
I disagree. A political science without objective ways to talk about the public interest is 
arid and narrow. It may be scientific, but it is not fully political. And economics, in spite of its 
own positivism, offers powerful theory about the public interest and meaningful ways to make 
such ideas concrete and subject to systematic analysis. This fact should be an important part of its 
appeal to students of politics. Economics has done more than our discipline or any other to make 
an explicit link between individual behavior and clear conceptions of collective, or public well­
being. We should make use of these ideas. Political science cannot affort to concede authority on 
such concepts to economists. 
I will present two major examples of economic theory that make this link. The first, 
general equilibrium theory, is a theory of an automatic, self-equilibrating system. Within its own 
terms, an economy characterized by general equilibrium needs no central political direction or 
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guidance. The second example, the theory of macroeconomic policy, is in that respect the 
opposite. This is in its essence a theory about central direction, guidance or control. It is a system 
that distills politics into the choice of the goals towards which the system is to be guided. 
Both examples are analytical systems that identify the systematic consequences of choices. 
General equilibrium theory identifies the consequences of the aggregation of countless private 
choices, while the theory of economic policy identifies the consequences of centralized choices of 
the settings of policy instruments. Both are ways of considering the public interest. 
General equilibrium theory. 
Economics characteristically begins with a presumption that people are rationally self­
interested, and moves from there to the most elaborate and impressive theory in the social 
sciences. Perhaps the greatest achievement of economics is to demonstrate that there can be a 
systematic connection between individual selfishness and collective well-being. 
Perhaps the most intuitively plausible idea is that individual selfishness would lead to 
collective outcomes that are inferior to other alternatives that might be achieved with less 
selfishness. This idea is captured by the prisoner's dilemma game, which has received its most 
careful and in depth analysis in the last thirty years, though the recognition of the problem goes 
back to Hobbes and to Aristotle. 
The central insight of economics is the basically less intuitive possibility that individual 
selfishness might systematically lead to collective well-being. (It is a mark of the success of 
economics that this idea is now considered intuitive.) The insight goes back at least to Adam 
Smith's metaphor of the invisible hand, and its modern manifestation is general equilibrium 
theory. As Arrow and Hahn (1971) describe it, this theory is the culmination of 
the notion that a social system moved by independent actions in pursuit of different values 
is consistent with a final coherent state of balance, and one in which the final outcomes 
may be quite different from those intended by the agents. 
Such a notion, they say, 
I agree. 
is surely the most important intellectual contribution that economic thought has made to 
the general understanding of social processes. (Arrow and Hahn, 1971, p. I). 
General equilibrium theory shows that competitive markets can not only achieve such a 
counterintuitive state, but also that the result can be desirable by a clear standard. Under clearly 
specified conditions, the result will be optimal, or efficient, by Pareto standards. That is, there 
will be no other outcome that can make any person better off without making someone else worse 
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off. This is a way of defining and operationalizing the common good, and relating it to individual 
preferences and decisions. 
If anyone is not impressed with this intellectual achievement, I suggest that they review 
some of the steps that were taken between 1776, when Smith's Wealth of Nations was published, 
and the 1970s, when the demonstrations of the existence, uniqueness, and properties of 
competitive equilibrium were completed.3
General equilibrium theory has few direct policy implications, though it is often taken to 
be a rationale for limited government. It does depend on some institutional features such as 
rules regarding property rights and the enforcement of contracts. Still, it is a theory of the public 
interest in which the optimum is reached through a process of decentralized coordination and 
without central direction or control. 
The theory of economic policy. 
The next theory I consider not only has very direct policy implications, it is in its essence a 
theory of central policy and control, as its name makes clear. The theory of economic policy is a 
formal representation of the Keynesian idea that policy instruments under the control of the 
government, such as those of fiscal and monetary policy, may be manipulated in order to change 
the values of target variables such as unemployment or inflation rates.4
In this theory, the target variables are the link to the public interest. A formulation of 
goals with respect to income growth, inflation and unemployment can be thought of as a "social 
welfare function" to be maximized, or a "policy loss function" to be minimized. In either case, 
there is a conceptualization of goals regarding economic performance that is meant to be a 
representation of what is good for the public. An explicitly formulated social welfare function 
permits a precise evaluation of the tradeoffs between conflicting objectives, and a precise 
statement of the relative valuation of present and future outcomes. The source or the authority of 
such welfare functions is often problematic, but the point for our purposes is that they are a 
concrete way of conceptualizing and operationalizing the common good. 
In many versions, it has been assumed that the macroeconomy is not an automatic, self­
equilibrating system. The rationale for policy might be that the state or path of the economy is not 
satisfactory, and that it needs direction or "medicine'', as was the case for the famous tax cut of 
1964 (Okun 1971, p. 43). Or the rationale might be that there is a need to respond to exogenous, 
stochastic shocks to the economy, such as an increase in the price of oil. 
The central idea is that the complex inter-relationships of a nation's economy can be 
represented by a structural model, i.e. a system of equations, or, for the layman, a "black box". A 
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complete version of such a model would represent markets for labor, for goods, and for financial 
services, and the connections between them. The relationship between a fiscal or monetary policy 
choice and a desired change in inflation or unemployment would be defined by the model of the 
economy. The technology might range from the back of an envelope to mathematical solutions to 
an econometrically estimated feedback control system. There are analogies to the systems used for 
sending rockets into outer space,and to the system used for controlling temperature in this 
building.5 
This theory of economic policy would seem to be near the ultimate in achievement in 
making the public policy process scientific. Goals that are meant to identify the public interest 
would be set through a political process, or perhaps identified by wise and benevolent authorities 
resembling economists, but the theory of economic policy would provide an objective, 
nonpolitical technology for achieving them. 
Politics in Economics II: 
Where Reasonable People Disagree. 
To say that economics gives us frameworks for objectively analyzing the public interest is 
to say that it is political. This is political theory in the sense that Plato and Rawls are political 
theorists, that is, in the most positive sense. However, I will argue in the next section that 
economics is political in a less lofty, but still perfectly respectable sense. Economics is a powerful 
language of discourse that can narrow the scope of diversity in conflicting views of what is in the 
public interest. However economics provides no escape. Such diversity is inevitable, and it is 
political. 
The two economic theories are impressive efforts to create an understanding of society 
that is rational and scientific as well as constructive and benevolent. They are examples of theories 
that might fulfil Professor Stigler's assertion that political systems are "rationally devised and 
rationally employed ... instruments for the fulfillment of the desires of members of society". 
However, there are important limitations to both achievements. Economists are among the first of 
those who identify these limitations. 
General equilibrium theory and market failure. 
There are questions to be raised about the scientific status of general equilibrium theory. 
For example, Mark Blaug points out that it is a set of possibility statements without empirical 
content, and that given the difference between it and the real world, it is inapplicable, rather than 
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false (1980, ch. 8).6 My concern is with another type of problem. Kenneth Arrow, one of the 
creators of general equilibrium theory, points out that "there is nothing in the process which 
guarantees that the distribution be just." Indeed, the theory itself shows that the final allocation 
will depend on the initial distributions of resources. Arrow argues that there is an "irreducible 
need for a social or collective choice on distribution ... (and) ... a great many other situations in 
which the replacement of market by collective decision making is necessary or at least desirable" 
(1974, p. 269). 
To make matters worse, this sobering conclusion brings us back to another problem, for 
which Arrow is much better known to political scientists: the demonstration that no constitution or 
collective decision procedure can simultaneously satisfy four seemingly innocuous normative 
conditions (1963). Thus the greatest achievement of microeconomic theory leaves us with clear 
indications of the normative inadequacy of the optimum it defines. And it leaves us with an 
"impossibility theorem" about the prospects of designing reasonable constitutions that might assure 
normative improvement. 
There is no basis for expecting to discover objectively optimal procedures that will 
generate "correct" collective decisions through the aggregation of preferences. This work provides 
a theoretical explanation for Stigler's observation that political life may involve a constantly 
shifting mixture of diverse forces, and a reason why such shifting may not yield to equilibrium 
even when political systems are rationally devised.7
There is, however, some encouraging light behind this gloomy assessment. Extensions of 
the theory of markets have provided a basis for theory about government in the form of a theory 
of market failure, which identifies conditions under which markets do not achieve desirable 
outcomes. It provides a systematic rationale for government activity by identifying conditions 
under which government intervention may be appropriate, even according to a theory of markets. 
Public officials who are informed by relevant economic theory would know when to intervene in 
order to provide public goods, limit externalities, regulate monopolies, enforce standards of health 
and safety, and even redistribute income. 
But how do we know that government will do this well? Until recently, economists have 
been somewhat slow to apply their premise of selfish rationality to public officials as well as 
economic agents. Government is often treated by economists as a benevolent dictator without 
incentives to deviate from the objective public good as defined by economic theory. The analogy 
between a benevolent dictator who thinks like an economist and the philosopher-king who 
contemplates ideal worlds is not the only similarity between economics and the Republic of Plato. 
It is in modelling the incentives and behavior of public officials that political scientists and 
economists have taken up the challenge Stigler offered above to develop a "rational theory of 
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politics". This has led to an emerging theory of "government failure" as a counterpart to the theory 
of market failure. We now recognize that government intervention may not necessarily improve on 
market failure. Intervention may make the problem worse.8
An important agenda for cooperation between political science and economics is to sort out 
the situations in which government intervention improves or fails to improve market failure, and 
to understand why. This can be done systematically, but it is hard to avoid making normative and 
empirical judgments about which reasonable people can disagree. This returns us to the messier 
world of politics, and the world of choice among imperfect institutions and policies through which 
collective choices can be made and implemented. 
Theories of market failure and government failure do not promise an escape from political 
disagreements about the implications of microeconomic theory. But they do provide a coherent 
framework, and a language of discourse in which defenders of markets and advocates of 
government intervention can debate and understand each other. The use of this framework for 
achieving common ground does not by any means assure agreement, but it does provide a 
conceptual basis for intelligible discourse, and possibly for the resolution of disputes. 
Some issues of dispute can be translated into empirical questions that might be resolved 
within the framework, but others remain more fundamental. Like the rest of us, economists differ 
among themselves in the degree to which they have trust and confidence in markets or in 
government. They also differ in the degree to which they think actual markets approximate the 
character of perfect markets. These are matters of belief, and "a belief in the market is as much a 
value judgment as a belief in the social beneficence of central planning" (Bromley, 1989, p. 103). 
But recognition of the importance of beliefs in economic theory should not make us 
distrust such theory. As Wittgenstein has said, "At the foundation of well-founded belief lies 
belief that is not founded" ( 1969, p. 33 ). Economics is a wonderful example of such a system of 
well founded beliefs. It is the less well-founded beliefs undergirding this system that makes many 
political scientists uncomfortable or even hostile, an issue to which I shall return. 
The theory of economic policy and the Lucas critique. 
Experience has not been kind to the theory of economic policy. After some premature 
self-congratulation in the 1960s (Heller 1966), economists found in the 1970s that many problems 
were beyond the control of macroeconomic policy. But the problems were deeper than 
unanticipated events like the oil price shocks and the disappearance of the simple tradeoff 
between inflation and unemployment. The field of macroeconomics itself went into "theoretical 
crisis" (Blanchard and Fischer 1989, pp. 26-27). Nothing did more to generate this crisis than the 
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"Lucas critique" of the theory of economic policy. 
Robert Lucas claimed that the kinds of macroeconomic models I described above "provide 
no useful information as to the actual consequences of alternative economic policies" ( I  976, 1981, 
p, 105; emphasis in original). The reason is that the equations in these models are not truly 
fundamental. They do not capture invariant properties of behavior, and their parameters are likely 
to change in response to policy changes. Under the assumptions of what are called "rational 
expectations" and market clearing, the absence of truly fundamental behavioral knowledge leads to 
the "policy ineffectiveness proposition". Specifically, any policy that is not a surprise will be 
neutralized and therefore ineffective. No model of the economy is so fundamental that economic 
agents will not adjust their behavior to neutralize or nullify an effort to control it. 
The only way that policy can be effective is for policymakers "to trick economic agents 
into behaving in socially preferable ways even though their behavior is not in their own interest" 
(R.G. Hall, quoted in Sargent and Wallace 1976, p. 176). In effect, Lucas pointed out that 
macroeconomic policymaking was not decision theory in the sense of a game against nature. 
Rather, it is a game involving other actors, who may respond strategically rather than passively to 
policy initiatives. 
There is a more general point that this new classical macroeconomic theory indirectly 
makes. The traditional theory of economic policy is a theory of how central policymakers can 
make choices that influence human behavior so as to improve collective outcomes. Skeptics who 
are hostile to social science in general have questioned whether human behavior can be controlled 
by policymakers who use social science knowledge to improve society. New classical 
macroeconomic theory is a profound, elaborate, and deep social science theory that comes to much 
the same conclusion. 
New classical macroeconomics is a theoretically coherent and rich demonstration of the 
general point that humans may resist manipulation even for ostensibly constructive purposes. As 
such it may provide suggestions that could help us understand why many of our institutional 
reforms do not have the consequences we expect them to have. Consider budget reform, deficit 
limits enforced by automatic sequester, campaign finance reform, and presidential nomination 
reform. 
Although new classical macroeconomics argues against activist stabilization policy, it is not 
without policy implications. The main implication is that policymakers should avoid discretionary 
responses to economic conditions, and instead follow rules without feedback. A prominent 
suggestion is a rule for a fixed rate of money growth, regardless of economic conditions. 
Not surprisingly, not all economists have embraced new classical rational expectations 
theory, or the policy ineffectiveness proposition. This is not the place to sort out all of the issues 
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involved, but this is the place to point out that there is in macroeconomic as well as 
microeconomic theory disagreement and lively debate about what should be the appropriate public 
institutions to guide private and public activity towards the common good. Sometimes the 
disagreement does not get as constructive as debate. Herbert Stein observes: 
Although there is much talk about economic policy, there is no debate. People say what 
they have always believed, or what they find it convenient to say, but there is no 
confrontation of arguments. There is no effort to find the sources of disagreement, or to 
reach agreement, perhaps because the participants think that the effort to change minds 
and reach agreement is hopeless. Talk about economic policy has become only a way of 
rallying one's troops (1984, p. 324). 
Like the issues in microeconomic theory and its implications for government, these 
disagreements involve differences in beliefs about human behavior, markets and government. 
Contending versions of macroeconomic theory are well founded systems of belief founded on 
beliefs that are not well founded. In this regard, macroeconomic theory is also political. It is still 
searching for a synthesis in a common language of discourse (see Taylor, 1986). 
Broadening Languages of Discourse. 
I have presented economics as political in two senses. First, I showed that it offers a 
framework in which we can systematically consider the public interest. Second, I showed that even 
the self-consciously scientific language of economics is vulnerable to dispute regarding beliefs. As 
the Stein quote indicated, economists themselves do not always listen to each other or try to reach 
agreement. Just as legislators and candidates for public office can talk past each other, so can 
partisans within academic disciplines. 
Although I have called attention to disagreements within two fields of economics, there is 
often more agreement among those identified than between them and most political scientists (see 
Coughlin, 1989). I would like to narrow a gulf between them and us that is based on some 
fundamental ideas about human nature. There is a view of the world that is shared by most 
economists, at least for purposes of going about their academic business. 
According to this view, individuals are the basic unit of analysis, and their preferences are 
exogenous and fixed. This assumption, a belief which is not very well founded, is the 
Archimedean point on which grand economic theories, i.e. well-founded systems of belief, are 
grounded. This is a very sound strategy for research and theory-building, and economics as we 
know it is a testimony to its power. In this section, I would like to bring forward some 
fundamental observations on the individual, and the nature of preferences. To some extent these 
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observations are at odds with conventional wisdom in economics, but I prefer to emphasize that 
they build on that wisdom, and that they provide a basis for a deeper understanding of politics. 
Along with most economists, I do not question the premise that the individual should be 
the basic unit of analysis in the study of economics and political science, but let me remind you 
that individuals are more complicated than is often implied by their treatment in economic 
analysis. As Coleman (1990), Elster (1984, 1986), March (1978), Schelling (1984), and others tell us 
convincingly, the self is not a simple, fixed entity with invariant tastes. We are, rather, 
complicated mixtures of conflicting desires. 
One central feature of this fact is the way that we as individuals relate our present 
behavior to our desires for our own future well-being. Consider the issues of alcohol and drug 
abuse, saving for college, losing weight, doing homework, and so on. This complexity of human 
desires is not so much a threat to economics or rational choice theory as a potential enrichment of 
it, as several economists recognize (see for example Thaler and Shefrin 1981, Frank 1985, Kuran 
1990). 
Just as the modelling of the behavior of ordinary humans can be improved by the 
recognition of this complexity of the self, so can the modelling of the behavior of public officials. 
The behavior of office seekers can be better understood by seeing it as motivated by policy as well 
as votes (Chappell and Keech 1986). The behavior of legislators can be better understood by 
seeing goals as varying within as well as across individuals according to a variety of situational 
factors (Fenno 1973, Hall 1987). 
Political scientists have learned a lot by adopting economic reasoning in modelling 
elections as interactions among individuals with fixed and exogenously defined preferences 
(Downs 1957, Enelow and Hinich 1984). However, we would be wise to acknowledge that our 
public policy preferences are not always so fixed. As Mark Blaug has observed, 
decision makers do not try to get what they want; rather they learn to want what they get. 
Means and ends are indissolubly related (1980; p. 151). 
What is desirable for public policy is defined by what we learn is feasible. 
Consider the standards for acceptable economic performance. In the 1960s, an inflation 
rate that was below five percent in the Johnson administration was considered unacceptably high. 
In 1971, President Nixon reversed his career-long opposition to price controls to deal with 
inflation of five percent. But after the double digit inflation of the 1970s, the Reagan 
administration was praised for bringing inflation down to such levels. While our standards for 
inflation have gone down, those for economic well being have gone up since the Depression. Alt 
(1979) has shown using British experience that they can go down as well. 
In my view there is nothing threatening to economics or political science in recognizing 
1 1  
that human beings are more complex than is sometimes acknowledged in standard models. Nor is 
there anything threatening to political science in the research strategy of modelling individual 
preferences as fixed and given in a variety of research settings. Models are to be used, not 
necessarily to be believed (Theil 1971, p. vi). 
William James once wrote that "The man who knows governments most completely is he 
who troubles himself least about a definition which shall give their essence" ( 1902, 1958, p. 39). 
Similarly, having identified politics as a cluster concept, I continue to avoid an attempt at specific, 
taxonomic definition. Still, it may be useful to call attention to an important feature of political 
life, which I presume is to be found in a variety of settings, including not only governments, but 
also academic disciplines such as economics and political science, as well as in churches, 
organizations, and families. 
Politics is, among other things, about the relationship between the individual and the 
polity, between the self and the collective unit. Political science and economics are each languages 
of discourse and systems of metaphors that are concerned with this relationship, but these 
disciplines often move in different directions and without mutual awareness. 
Systems of metaphors highlight aspects of reality. A key advantage of economics is its 
systematic attention to the relationship between individual choices, collective choices, and the 
common good. But systems of metaphors can hide aspects of reality as well. Lakoff and Johnson 
argue that 
in the area of politics and economics, metaphors matter more, because they constrain our 
lives. A metaphor in a political or economic system, by virtue of what it hides, can lead to 
human degradation ( 1980, p. 236). 
Many political scientists resist the advantages of economics as a language of discourse, and there 
are many reasons for this, not all of them defensible. I believe that one of these reasons is a fear 
that economic metaphors imply a one dimensional treatment of human beings as consumption 
machines, and that this is degrading. 
Political science has historically been much more sensitive than economics to multiple 
dimensions of the human condition, and this is a strength we should maintain. However, I have 
tried to show that economic reasoning is not necessarily limited to the analysis of fixed and 
exogenous preferences among consumption bundles. And the application of economic reasoning to 
political life is not incompatible with the quest for individual self-realization and self-respect (see 
Riker, 1982, especially ch. I). Political life involves a diversity of interests, values, beliefs, and 
preferences. These may be compatible or incompatible, reasonable or unreasonable, admirable or 
reprehensible. They may be selfish or altruistic, shortsighted or farsighted, manifest or latent. As 
Madison put it in Federalist No. 10, the "latent causes of faction are ... sown in the nature of man". 
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This diversity is part of the human condition. Without it there would be little, if anything, to 
political life. 
Politics involves the inevitable risk that selfishness and narrowness of perspective interfere 
with public well-being. But politics is also the process by which private preferences are balanced 
against "the permanent and aggregate interests of the community", (to use Madison's language 
again). And politics is the process by which private judgments about the public interest are 
weighed and aggregated. When public purposes are defined in terms of individual preferences and 
interests, economics can provide invaluable tools for systematic analysis of the consequences of 
individual actions and choices for collective well-being. 
Rigid disciplinary boundaries protect us from confusion by the insights of other 
disciplines working on similar problems. We have much to gain by learning from economics. 
However, we will do well to keep our bearings by drawing on the insights into political life 
deriving from the grand tradition of political philosophy, and from modern political science as 
well. 
Economics is a little like Newtonian physics in the clarity and rigor of its mathematical 
systems. However, political life may be more like biology than like physics (Masters 1989, 
Schubert 1989). And this metaphor suggests that a subject matter that involves a "constantly and 
unpredictably shifting mixture of forces" can lend itself to objective and scientific analysis. This 
is our task and our challenge. 
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Endnotes 
I. See also Connolly 1983. 
2. See Mueller 1989 for a review.
3. See Kreps 1990, chapter 6, and Duffie and Sonnenschein 1989.
4. Actually, the theory was developed independently in Holland about the same time as the
publication of Keynes's General Theory ( I  936). The seminal work is Tinbergen 1963. For 
an accessible contemporary treatment, see Bryant 1980. 
5. See Kendrick 1988 for a technical treatment that is accessible to the layman.
6. See Kreps 1990, chapter l ,  for a defense.
7. See Riker 1982, and Kingdon 1984 for theoretically sensitive treatments that show
politics as fluid. 
8. For original sources and further developments on market failure, see Cowen 1988. On
government failure, see Wolf 1988, and Shepsle and Weingast 1984. See also Cullis and 
Jones 1987, and Bromley 1989. 
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